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Abstract
A single seller faces a sequence of buyers with unit demand. The buyers are
forward-looking and long-lived. Each buyer has private information about his
arrival time and valuation where the latter evolves according to a geometric
Brownian motion. Any incentive-compatible mechanism has to induce truthtelling about the arrival time and the evolution of the valuation.
We establish that the optimal stationary allocation policy can be implemented by a simple posted price. The truth-telling constraint regarding the
arrival time can be represented as an optimal stopping problem which determines the first time at which the buyer participates in the mechanism. The
optimal mechanism thus induces progressive participation by each buyer: he
either participates immediately or at a future random time.
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Introduction

We consider a classic mechanism design problem in a dynamic environment. The
seller (she) seeks to offer a good (or service) to the buyers for recurring consumption.
The willingness to pay of each buyer (he) evolves according to a geometric Brownian
motion over time and is private information. The arrival time (and departure time)
of each buyer is random and private information as well. The buyer can choose the
time at which he enters into a contract with the seller. While he can participate in a
contract with the seller immediately upon arrival, he has the option to postpone his
participation until a future date. Thus, participation may be progressive over time.
The objective of the seller is to find a stationary revenue-maximizing mechanism in
this dynamic environment. The design of the contract or mechanism is unrestricted
and may consist of leasing contracts, sale contracts, or any other form of dynamic
contract.
We depart from much of the earlier analysis of dynamic mechanisms in our treatment of the participation decision of the buyer, with the notable exception of Garrett
(2016), that we will discuss shortly. Each buyer has the option to wait and sign any
contract after he has received additional information about his willingness to pay. In
particular, he can time the acceptance of a contract until he has a sufficiently high
willingness to pay. Thus, both the participation constraints that are in place before
the buyer has signed the contract and the incentive constraints after the buyer has
signed the contract are fully responsive to the arrival of new information, and are
consequently represented as sequential constraints.
Our main result (Theorem 3) is that a single sale price is indeed an optimal progressive mechanism in the class of all possible stationary mechanisms. More precisely,
a single posted price is a simple indirect implementation of a direct mechanism that
achieves the revenue-maximizing optimum. The main challenge in establishing this
result is the sequential participation constraints. These new constraints state that
the value function of the buyer must be the solution to an optimal stopping problem,
which itself involves the value function. We relax this problem by restricting the
buyer to a small set of deviations, namely threshold strategies. This relaxation has
the advantage that the buyer’s participation strategies can be mapped into the real
2

line, which allows us to reduce the problem into a static mechanism design problem.
This static problem is a variant of the classical nonlinear pricing problem of Mussa
and Rosen (1978), with the non-standard feature that each buyer can (deterministically) increase his type at the cost of multiplicatively decreasing his interim utility.
This additional constraint leads to a failure of the first-order approach. We show
that the resulting mathematical program can be expressed as a Pontryagin control
problem with contact constraints (Theorem 2) and develop a verification result for
such problems which might be of independent interest (Theorem 1).
In earlier work on dynamic mechanism design, the seller is typically (i) assumed
to know the arrival time of the buyer and (ii) has the ability to commit herself to
make a single and once-and-for-all offer to the buyer at the moment of arrival. In
particular, the seller can commit herself to never make another offer to the buyer in
any future period. The dynamic revenue-maximizing mechanism—in the absence of
sequential participation constraints—sells the object with probability one and forever
at fixed price (see Bergemann and Strack, 2015). Thus, the object is sold to all
buyers who have an initial willingness to pay above a certain threshold. Conversely,
all buyers whose initial value is below this threshold would not buy the object, neither
at the beginning of time, nor anytime thereafter. Thus, both in the dynamic as well
as in the progressive mechanism, the optimal allocation can be implemented by an
indirect mechanism in the form of a posted price. But in the dynamic mechanism the
posted price is offered as part of a “buy now or never” sale, whereas in the progressive
mechanism the posted price is offered as part of a “buy whenever” sale. Thus the
posted price leads to very distinct allocations in case an immediate sale does not
occur.
We view the relaxation of the two above mentioned restrictions as a significant
step to bring the design of dynamic mechanisms closer to many interesting economic
applications. For example, the consumer clearly has a choice of when to sign up
for a mobile phone contract, a gym membership, or a service contract for a kitchen
appliance. Importantly, as the consumer waits, he may receive more information
about his willingness to pay for the product. To the extent that these restrictions
impose additional constraints on the seller, they directly weaken the power of dynamic
mechanism design. The additional constraints for the seller are reflected in a larger set
3

of reporting strategies for the buyers. A buyer can misreport both his willingness to
pay as well as his arrival time. This creates an option value for the buyer, as instead of
choosing a contract immediately he can wait and enter into a contract with the seller
when it is most favorable for him to do so. Given the menu of contracts offered by the
seller, the buyer thus solves an optimal stopping problem to determine when to enter
into a contractual relationship with the seller. Subject to the (random) evolution of
his type and his willingness to pay, he can choose when to enter into an agreement
with the seller. This suggests that the buyer will receive a larger information rent
than in the standard dynamic mechanism design framework where the buyer has to
sign a contract with the seller immediately.
The analysis of revenue-maximizing mechanisms in an environment where the
buyer’s private information changes over time started with Baron and Besanko (1984)
and Besanko (1985). Since these early contributions, recent notable contributions are
by Courty and Li (2000), Battaglini (2005), Eső and Szentes (2007), and Pavan et al.
(2014).1 These papers derive in increasing generality the dynamic revenue-maximizing
mechanism. The analysis in these contributions have in common the same set of
constraints on the choice of mechanism. The seller has to satisfy all of the sequential
incentive constraints, but only a single ex-ante participation constraint. In earlier
work, Bergemann and Strack (2015), we considered the same set of constraints in a
continuous-time setting, which permits for additional and explicit results regarding
the nature of the optimal allocation policy—an outcome unattainable in the discretetime setting. Here, we again use the continuous-time setting for very similar reasons.
Garrett (2016) offers a notable exception by considering unobservable arrival and
stochastic values in which the private value of each buyer is governed by a Markov
process with binary values, low and high. The set of allocation policies is restricted
to any deterministic time-dependent sales price policy. The seller maximizes the expected discounted revenue. Garrett (2016) then provides conditions under which a
time-invariant price path is optimal within the class of deterministic price paths. He
further observes that an optimal policy in the class of all dynamic direct mechanisms—
one that does not restrict attention to deterministic sale price paths (and implied
1

Bergemann and Välimäki (2019) provide a survey into the recent developments of dynamic
mechanism design.
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restrictions on reporting types)—may lead to very different results and implications.
By contrast, we establish that a sale price policy is optimal in the class of all stationary mechanisms, including leasing and buy-back policies. Thus, the restrictions
on mechanisms in Garrett (2016) and our paper differ in two dimensions. Whereas
Garrett (2016) only allows deterministic sale price policies, we allow all possible allocation policies. However, we restrict attention to stationary policies, whereas he
allows time-dependent policies such as price cycles. Thus, the set of feasible policies
is not nested in either direction.2
The importance of a privately observed arrival time is also investigated in Deb
(2014) and Garrett (2017). In contrast to the present work, these papers do not
investigate a stationary environment. Instead, while the mechanism starts at time
zero, the buyer may arrive at a later time. The main concern therefore is how to
encourage the early arrival to contract early. In a setting with either a durable or
non-durable good, respectively, these authors find that the optimal mechanism treats
early-arriving participants more favorably than late-arriving participants, in terms of
prices and quantities.
A separate literature analyzes the optimal sales of a durable good with the recurrent entry of new consumers, and is directly concerned with the timing of the purchase
decision of the buyers. This literature, beginning with Conlisk et al. (1984), Sobel
(1991), and more recently Board (2008), restricts attention to (i) a sequence of prices
rather than general allocation mechanisms, and (ii) perfectly persistent values. There
are related concerns with the emphasis on the ex-ante participation constraints in the
literature on dynamic mechanism design that pursue different directions from the one
presented here. Skreta (2006, 2015), Deb and Said (2015), and Lobel and Paes Leme
(2019) investigate the sequential screening model under limited commitment by the
seller and pursue the equilibrium implications. A more radical departure from the
ex-ante or interim participation constraint to ex-post participation constraints is suggested in recent work by Krähmer and Strausz (2015), Ashlagi et al. (2016), and
Bergemann et al. (2020) in the context of the sequential screening model of Courty
2

We consider a continuum of values rather than binary values. We conjecture that a sale price
would also remain the optimal stationary policy with binary values generated by a Markov process
as in Garrett (2016).
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and Li (2000).
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 introduces the model
and the mechanism design problem. Section 3 shows how the progressive mechanism
design problem can be related to an auxiliary static problem. Section 4 reviews the
optimal mechanism in an environment with observable arrival. Section 5 derives the
optimal progressive mechanism. Section 6 discusses how the arguments developed
generalize beyond geometric Brownian motion and stationary mechanisms. Section 7
concludes.

2

Model

Payoffs and Allocation We consider a stationary model with a single seller (she)
and a single representative buyer (he). Time is continuous and indexed by t ∈ [0, ∞).
The seller and the buyer discount the future at the same rate r > 0. At each time t,
the buyer demands one unit of the good. The buyer departs and gets replaced with a
newly arriving buyer at rate γ ≥ 0.3 The first buyer arrives at time 0 and we denote
by i the buyer who arrived i-th to the market. We denote the random arrival time
of buyer i by αi ∈ R+ , and the random departure time of buyer i equals the random
arrival time αi+1 ∈ R+ of buyer i + 1.4
The flow valuation of buyer i at time t ∈ [αi , αi+1 ] is denoted by θti ∈ R+ , and the
quantity allocated to buyer i at time t is xit ∈ [0, 1]. The flow preferences of the buyer
are represented by a (quasi-)linear utility function:
uit = θti xit − pit ,

(1)

and pit ∈ R is the flow payment from the buyer to the seller.
3

The model allows for the special case of a single agent who is not replaced by setting γ = 0 and
this case is sufficient to understand many of the trade-offs in the choice of the optimal progressive
mechanism.
4
An equivalent formulation would consist of a continuum of buyers where each buyer arrives and
departs with rate γ. The average behavior of such a continuum of buyers will match the expected
behavior of a single representative buyer. The main advantage of the representative buyer model is
that it avoids technical issues due to integration over a continuum of independent random variables,
which is formally not well-defined in standard probability theory, see e.g. Judd (1985).
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The arrival time αi (and the departure time αi+1 ) as well as the flow valuations
(θsi )s∈[αi ,t] are private information held by buyer i at time t.5 The arrival and departure
time of each buyer are assumed to be independent of his valuation process. The
valuation of buyer i, θti ∈ R+ , at the time of his arrival t = αi is distributed according
 
to a cumulative distribution function: F : 0, θ → R;with strictly positive, bounded
density f ≡ F 0 > 0 on the support. The prior distribution F is the same for every
buyer i and every arrival time αi .
The valuation of each buyer evolves randomly over time, independent of the valuation of other buyers. We assume that each buyer’s valuation (θti )t∈[αi ,∞) follows a
geometric Brownian motion:6
dθti = σ θti dWt ,
(2)
where (Wt )t∈R+ is a Brownian motion and σ ∈ R+ is the volatility which measures
the speed of information arrival. The geometric Brownian motion forms a martingale
and consequently the buyer’s best estimate of his valuation at any future time is his
current valuation, i.e. for all s ≥ t : Et [θsi ] = θti . Furthermore, θti takes only positive
values, and so the buyer’s valuation for the good is always positive. The flow of
allocations (xit ) and payments (pit ) will depend on the reports of the buyer to the
seller, to which we turn next.

Stationary Mechanism A mechanism specifies after each history a set of messages
for each buyer and the allocation as a function of the complete history of messages
sent by this buyer. Throughout this paper, we impose that the allocation—quantity
and monetary transfer—are independent of the identity of buyer i. The quantity
process (xt ) specifies whether or not the buyer consumes the good at any time. We
5

We note that as the arrival time is private information to buyer i, the departure time has to be
private information as well, or else the departure of buyer i would be informative of the arrival time
of buyer i + 1.
6
It is without loss of generality to assume that the drift of the geometric Brownian motion of the
buyer’s valuation is zero. We could allow for any positive drift µ as long as µ is smaller than the
discount rate. If the value would solve the stochastic differential equation dθti = θti (µdt + σdWt ),
then the adjusted process θ̃ti = e−µ t θti would be a martingale. Thus, the buyer’s value for the object
at time t is the same as if his value were θ̃ti and his discount rate were r − µ. The fact that the buyer
discounts the transfer at a different rate relative to the allocation is irrelevant as he still discounts
the transfers at the same rate as the seller.
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assume that the assignment of the object is reversible, i.e. the seller can give the
buyer an object for some time and then take it away later.
Definition 1 (Mechanism).
A mechanism (x, p) specifies at every time t ∈ R+ , where some buyer i is active
t ∈ [αi , αi+1 ), the allocation xt ((mis )αi ≤s≤t ) as well as the transfer pt ((mis )αi ≤s≤t ) as a
function of the messages (mis )αi ≤s≤t sent by this buyer prior to time t.
A direct mechanism is a mechanism where the messages of the buyer are his
reported arrival time and his reported flow valuations. We denote the reported arrival
time α̂ and reported valuations (θ̂s )α̂≤s≤t by the circumflex to distinguish true and
reported times and valuations.
Definition 2 (Direct Mechanism).
A direct mechanism (x, p) specifies at every time t ∈ R+ , where buyer i is reported
present t ∈ [α̂i , α̂i+1 ), the allocation xt (α̂i , (θ̂si )α̂i ≤s≤t ) and the transfer pt (α̂i , (θ̂si )α̂i ≤s≤t )
as a function of the reported arrival time α̂i and reported valuations (θ̂si )α̂i ≤s≤t .
As the payoff environment is stationary, we restrict attention to stationary mechanisms where the allocations are independent of the arrival time of the buyer. More
formally, we require that a buyer who arrives at time α and whose valuations follows
the path (θs ), receives the same allocation as a buyer who arrives at a different time
α0 and whose valuations follow the same path of valuations shifted by the difference
in arrival times, i.e. θs0 = θs+(α−α0 ) . Thus, the seller cannot discriminate against the
buyer based on his arrival time.
Definition 3 (Stationary Direct Mechanism).
A direct mechanism (x, p) is stationary if for all arrival times α, α0 and valuation
paths θ:
xt (α, (θs )α≤s≤t ) = xt+(α0 −α) (α0 , (θs )α0 ≤s≤t+(α0 −α) ),
pt (α, (θs )α≤s≤t ) = pt+(α0 −α) (α0 , (θs )α0 ≤s≤t+(α0 −α) ).
We should emphasize that in a stationary mechanism, the allocation can depend
on the tenure of the agent, thus in particular the length and entire contingent history
8

of the relationship, but not on the arrival time of the agent. The stationarity of
the mechanism leads to the distinct interpretation of a sales price alluded to in the
Introduction. A stationary sales price is a “buy whenever” price, whereas the sales
price in the presence of observable arrival is a “buy now or never” price.7

Progressive Mechanism By the revelation principle we can, without loss of generality, restrict attention to direct mechanisms where it is optimal for the buyer to
report his arrival time α and his valuation θt truthfully at every time t. Each buyer
i seeks to maximize his discounted expected net utility given his valuation θαi i at his
arrival time αi :

ˆ αi+1

−r(t−αi )
i i
i
i
E
e
θt xt − pt dt | αi , θαi .
αi

The seller seeks to maximize the expected discounted net revenue collected from her
interaction with the sequence of all buyers:

E

"∞ ˆ
X
i=0

αi+1

#
e−r t pit

dt .

(3)

αi

Define the indirect utility Vα : R+ → R of a buyer who arrives at time α with a
value of θα and reports his arrival and valuations (θs )α≤s≤t truthfully by:
ˆ

αi+1

−r (t−αi )

e

Vα (θα ) = E
i
ˆα∞

e

=E

θti xit

−(r+γ) (t−αi )

−

θti xit

αi

pit

−



dt | αi =

pit



α, θαi i

dt | αi =


= θα

α, θαi i


= θα .

The second equality follows immediately from the law of iterated expectations and
the fact that the departure time αi+1 of the buyer is independent of the arrival time
7

A literal interpretation of the representative agent model might suggest additional revelation of
information. For example, if the single departing buyer could inform the seller about his departure,
then within the current representative agent model, the seller would also be informed about the
arrival of a new buyer, and hence turn the private information regarding the arrival time into
public information available to the seller. We do not adopt this literal interpretation as we take
the representative agent to represent a large number of departing and arriving agents. Formally,
the definition of a stationary mechanism does not allow the mechanism to be contingent on the
departure (or arrival) time of the buyer.
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αi and the valuation process θi , and hence of xit , pit .
It is optimal for the buyer to report truthfully if
ˆ
Vα (θα ) ≥

∞

sup E
α̂≥αi ,(θ̂t )

−(r+γ) (t−αi )

e

θti

x̂it

−

α̂

p̂it



dt | αi =

α, θαi i


= θα ,

(IC)

where allocation x̂it = xt (α̂, (θ̂s )α̂≤s≤t ) as well as payment p̂it = pt (α̂, (θ̂s )α̂≤s≤t ) are
functions of the reported arrival time α̂ as well as all subsequently reported valuations
(θ̂s )α̂≤s≤t . We note here that the supremum in (IC) is taken over stopping times α̂ as
the buyer can condition his reported arrival on his current (and past) valuation θt .
We restrict attention to mechanisms where the buyer participates voluntarily, i.e.
for all arrival times α and all initial values θα , the buyer’s expected utility from
participating in the mechanism is non-negative:
Vα (θα ) ≥ 0 .

(PC)

While imposing incentive compatibility constraints (IC) as well as participation
constraints (PC) is standard in the literature on (dynamic) mechanism design, we
note that the incentive compatibility constraint (IC) imposed here is stronger than
the one usually imposed in the literature. As the arrival time α is not observable, the
seller has to provide incentives for the buyer to report his arrival truthfully. In fact,
the incentive constraint (IC) directly implies the participation constraint (PC), as
the buyer can always decide to never report his arrival, α̂ = ∞. We denote by M the
set of all incentive-compatible stationary mechanisms where every buyer participates
voluntarily.
The seller seeks to maximize her revenue subject to the incentive and participation
constraints, and we refer to this as the progressive mechanism design problem.

3

Aggregation and Revenue Equivalence

As a first and significant step in the analysis, we establish that the progressive mechanism design problem can be related to an auxiliary static problem. The static
formulation aggregates the progressive problem over time with suitable weights into
10

a static problem. In the new static problem, the buyer reports only his initial valuation and the seller chooses an expected and discounted aggregate quantity q ∈ R+
to allocate to the buyer. We establish that in any incentive-compatible progressive
mechanism, both the value of the buyer as well as the revenue of the seller are only
a function of this aggregate quantity.
Towards this end, we first rewrite the revenue of the seller from the sequence of
buyers, given by (3) in terms of the revenue collected from the interaction with a
single buyer i only. After all, in a stationary direct mechanism, the allocation and
transfer depend only on the time elapsed since the arrival time of buyer i.
Lemma 1 (Expected Revenue).
The expected discounted revenue in the optimal mechanism equals
r+γ
max E
r (x,p)∈M

ˆ

αi+1



e−r (t−αi ) pit dt

,

(4)

αi

where i is an arbitrary buyer.
The proofs of some of the auxiliary results are relegated to the Appendix. This
result follows directly from the independence of values across the buyers. The term
(r + γ)/r results from the geometric series of discounting and replacement, and can
be interpreted as the discounted number of generations. We can therefore, without
loss of generality, assume that the representative buyer arrives at time zero, αi = 0,
to determine the revenue the seller derives from her interaction with all the buyers.
With the focus on a single instance of buyer i, we can therefore drop the index i
indicating his identity i and his arrival time αi and denote by V (θ0 ) the indirect
utility of the buyer who arrived at time t = 0 with initial valuation θ0 .
We now define an “aggregate quantity” q : Θ → R+ which is allocated to a buyer
with initial valuation θ0 by:
ˆ
q(θ0 ) , E

∞
−(r+γ) t

e
0


dθt
xt
dt | θ0 .
dθ0

(5)

The aggregate quantity q(θ0 ) is the expected discounted integral over the flow quantities (xt ). The flow quantity xt is weighted by a term that represents the information
rent in period t due to the initial private information θ0 , as we explain next.
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The first term inside the integral is simply the discounted quantity in period t,
e−(r+γ) t xt . The second term is the derivative of the valuation θt in period t with
respect to the initial value θ0 . We can now use the fact that the geometric Brownian
motion can be explicitly represented as:

 2
σ
θt = θ0 exp − t + σWt ,
2
and thus the derivative is given by:
 2

dθt
σ
= exp − t + σ Wt .
dθ0
2
The above derivative represents the influence that the initial value θ0 has on the
future state θt . We note that the impulse response in the case of the geometric
Brownian motion is independent of the initial state θ0 . In Bergemann and Strack
(2015), we referred to it as stochastic flow (see Kunita, 1997), and it is the analogue
of the impulse response function in a discrete time dynamic mechanism (see Pavan
et al., 2014, Definition 3). We can therefore write the aggregate quantity q(θ0 ) more
explicitly as:
ˆ

∞
−(r+γ) t

e

q(θ0 ) , E
0



σ2
xt exp − t + σ Wt dt | θ0 .
2


(6)

The expected “aggregate quantity” q(θ0 ) thus weighs the discounted quantity with
the corresponding stochastic flow, or information rent, that originates from the initial
value θ0 . As the quantity xt is bounded between 0 and 1 and the exponential term
is a martingale, it follows that the aggregate quantity is bounded as well, i.e. for all
θ0 ∈ [0, θ] :
1
0 ≤ q(θ0 ) ≤
.
(7)
r+γ
We complete the description of the static auxiliary problem with the virtual value at
time t = 0:
1 − F (θ0 )
,
(8)
J(θ0 ) , θ0 −
f (θ0 )
the “virtual flow value” of the buyer upon arrival to the mechanism. As in the
12

discrete time setting, the stochastic flow enters the dynamic version of virtual utility
as established in Theorem 1 of Bergemann and Strack (2015):
Jt (θt ) , θt −

1 − F (θ0 ) dθt
.
f (θ0 ) dθ0

(9)

We denote by
θ◦ , inf{θ0 : J(θ0 ) ≥ 0},

(10)

the lowest type with a non-negative virtual value. We assume that the distribution
of initial valuations is such that θ 7→ min{0, f (θ)J(θ)} is non-decreasing.8
The expected quantity q and the virtual utility J are useful as they completely
summarize the expected discounted revenue of the seller and the value of the buyer.
Proposition 1 (Aggregation and Revenue Equivalence).
In any incentive-compatible mechanism:
(a) the value of the buyer with initial valuation θ is:
ˆ

θ

q(z)dz + V (0) ,

V (θ) =

(11)

0

and the expected discounted revenue of the seller is:
ˆ

∞
−(r+γ) t

e

E
0



ˆ

θ

J(θ)q(θ)dF (θ) − V (0) ;

pt dt =

(12)

0

(b) the aggregate quantity q(θ0 ) increases in θ0 .
Proposition 1 gives expressions of the objective functions of the buyer and seller
in terms of the discounted quantities q only. In earlier work, we obtained a revenue
equivalence result for dynamic allocation problems (see Theorem 1 in Bergemann
and Strack (2015)). The new and important insight of Proposition 1 is that we
can aggregate the intertemporal allocation (xt ) into a single static quantity q(θ0 )
8

This is a weak technical assumption which is satisfied for most standard distributions like
the uniform distribution, the exponential distribution, or the log-normal distribution. For example, for the uniform distribution U ([0, θ]) we have that f (θ)J(θ) = (2θ − θ)/θ, which is increasing in θ. For the exponential distribution with mean µ > 0 we have that min{0, f (θ)J(θ)} =
min {0, (θ/µ − 1) exp (−θ/µ)} , which is also increasing in θ.
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that serves as a sufficient statistic for the determination of the indirect utility and
the discounted revenue at the same time. In the presence of the geometric Brownian
motion and unit demand, Proposition 1 asserts that there is a particularly transparent
reduction given by (5). We should emphasize that the reduction to an auxiliary
static program can be extended to a wide class of stochastic processes and allocation
problems. We discuss these generalizations in detail in Section 6.
Proposition 1 follows from the the truth-telling constraint at time zero. We emphasize that the conditions of Proposition 1 provide only necessary conditions for
incentive compatibility and optimality of the mechanisms as they omit:
(i) the possibility to misreport the arrival time, and
(ii) the buyer’s truth-telling constraints after time zero.
Indeed we will show in Section 4 that the monotonicity of q is not a sufficient condition
for incentive compatibility under unobservable arrival. We find that there are further
restrictions on the shape of the aggregate quantity q(θ0 ) beyond monotonicity that
are due to the above intertemporal incentive constraints (i) and (ii). These additional
restrictions will impose upper bounds on the derivative of aggregate quantity q(θ0 ).
In consequence, the revenue problem given by (12) is transformed from what looks
like a standard unit demand problem with extremal solutions to an optimal control
problem.
We will derive the revenue-maximizing mechanism for the seller when she does
not observe the arrival time of the buyer in Section 5. As a point of reference, it will
be instructive for us to first understand what the seller would do if the (individual)
arrival time of each buyer would be observable by the seller.

4

Failure of Local Incentive Compatibility with
Unobservable Arrival

With observable arrival, the optimal direct mechanism can be implemented by a
simple sales contract. We first review these results and then investigate how this
specific sales contract performs in an environment with unobservable arrival.
14

With observable arrival time by the buyer, we are in the canonical dynamic mechanism design environment. In Bergemann and Strack (2015), we derived the revenuemaximizing mechanism for the current problem of interest: unit demand with values
governed by a geometric Brownian motion. The optimal mechanism can be implemented by an indirect mechanism that offers the product for sale at an optimally
determined price P (see Proposition 8 of Bergemann and Strack (2015)). The optimal mechanism awards the object to the buyer if and only if his virtual value is
positive upon arrival: J(θ0 ) ≥ 0, where the critical value threshold θ◦ is determined
by J(θ◦ ) = 0.
The buyer thus receives the object forever whenever his initial valuation θ0 is
above the threshold value θ◦ . With observable arrival this allocation can be implemented in a sales contract where the seller charges a sales price of θ◦ /(r + γ), which
entitles the buyer to ownership and continued consumption at all future times. A
revenue-equivalent implementation would be to sell the good at time t = 0 and then
charge the buyer a constant flow price of p◦ = θ◦ , in all future periods, independent
of his future value θs , for all s ≥ 0. Thus, the indirect utility of the buyer when his
arrival is observable equals


θ0 − θ◦
.
V (θ0 ) = max 0,
r+γ
We now abandon the restrictive informational assumption of observable arrival
and let the arrival time be private information to each buyer. We ask what would
happen if the seller were to maintain the above sales policy at the optimal observable
price p◦ , as a stationary contract. Now, any newly arriving buyers with value close to
p◦ would conclude that rather than buy immediately, he should wait until he learns
more about his value, and purchase the object if and only if he learned that he has a
sufficiently high valuation for the object. Thus, the sale would occur (i) later and (ii)
to fewer buyers. Thus, the sale price contract fails to remain incentive-compatible in
an environment with unobservable arrival times.
Still, we can ask how the buyer would behave when faced with a stationary mechanism that offers him the object for sale at flow price p. In the presence of unobservable
arrival, the buyer can determine the optimal purchase time by an optimal stopping
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problem. We denote by T the random time at which the buyer leaves the market.
If the buyer acquires the good at time t with valuation θt at any given price p > 0,
whether it is p = p◦ or not, then his expected continuation utility is:
ˆ

T
−r (s−t)

e

Et

ˆ


(θs − p) ds = (θt − p) Et

t

T
−r (s−t)

e
t


ds =

θt − p
.
r+γ

The first equality above follows from the fact that θ is a martingale (independent of
T ), the second equality follows as the time T at which the buyer leaves the market is
exponentially distributed with mean t + 1/γ (from a time t perspective). The time τ
at which the buyer optimally purchases the good thus solves the stopping problem:
sup
τ



1
E e−r τ 1{τ <T } (θτ − p) .
r+γ

As the buyer leaves the market with rate γ, this problem is equivalent to the problem
where the discount rate is given by (r + γ), i.e. the buyer solves the stopping problem
sup
τ



1
E e−(r+γ) τ (θτ − p) .
r+γ

(13)

The stopping problem given in (13) is the classic irreversible investment problem
analyzed in Dixit and Pindyck (1994, Chapter 5, p.135 ff.). For a given sales price p,
it leads to a determination of a threshold w(p) that the buyer’s valuation θτ needs to
reach at the stopping time τ .9
To simplify notation, we define a constant β that summarizes the discount rate r,
the renewal rate γ, and the variance σ 2 in a manner relevant for the stopping problem:
1 1
β, +
2 2

r
1+8

r+γ
> 1.
σ2

(14)

Proposition 2 (Sales Contract).
9

Dixit and Pindyck (1994) consider an investment problem with a real asset. There, the geometric
Brownian motion may have a growth rate, thus a positive drift, α > 0. The positive quadratic root in
their equation (16) becomes (14) after setting the growth rate α, the drift of the geometric Brownian,
to zero. The discount rate ρ in Dixit and Pindyck (1994) is in our setting the sum of the discount
and renewal rates, thus ρ = r + γ. The difference between the discount and growth rate, δ = ρ − α,
is then simply the adjusted discount rate.
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V (θ0 )
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0
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Figure 1: The value function of the buyer in a sales contract with flow price p = 1
when he has to participate immediately (dashed blue) and when he can delay his
arrival (red), given β = 1.7.
In a sales contract with flow price p, the buyer acquires the object once his valuation
θ reaches a time independent threshold w(p) given by:
w(p) =

β
p.
β−1

(15)

The buyer’s value in this sales contract is given by

V (θ) =

β




1
r+γ





1
r+γ

(w(p) − p) ,

θ
w(p)

(w(p) − p) ,

if θ < w(p);
if θ ≥ w(p).

Proof. The result follows from Dixit and Pindyck (1994), Section 5.2.
We can now illustrate the payoff consequences due to the private information
regarding the arrival time. In Figure 1 we display the value functions of the buyer
across these two informational environments. The blue line depicts the value function
for the buyer in the setting with observable arrival time. The value is zero for all
values below the threshold θ◦ and then a linear function of the initial value. Notably,
the value function has a kink at the threshold level θ◦ . The red curve depicts the
value function when the sales contract is offered at the above terms as a stationary
contract.
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As shown in Proposition 2, the buyer reacts to this contract by reporting his
arrival only once his value exceeds:
w(p◦ ) = w(θ◦ ) =

β ◦
θ > θ◦ .
β−1

Now, the value function is smooth everywhere and coincides with the blue curve
whenever the initial value weakly exceeds the critical type w(p◦ ). Importantly, for all
values θ0 below w(p◦ ), the red curve is above the blue curve, which depicts the option
value as expressed by (15). Notably, the value is strictly positive for all initial values,
which expresses the fact that the option value guarantees every value θ0 an information
rent, quite distinct from the environment with observable arrival. Hence all buyers
with low valuations would deviate by not reporting their arrival immediately, and the
optimal contract with observable arrival cannot be implemented with unobservable
arrival. Thus, the optimal sales contract under observable arrival fails to remain
incentive-compatible in an environment with unobservable arrival.

5

The Optimal Progressive Mechanism

The discussion in the previous section establishes that the first-order approach fails
once the buyer can misreport his arrival time. To identify the optimal policy that
satisfies the arrival incentive constraint we will employ the following strategy: First,
we identify tractable necessary conditions for the truthful reporting of arrival by
considering a specific class of deviations in the arrival time dimension. We then find
the optimal mechanisms for the relaxed problem where we impose only these necessary
conditions using a novel result on optimization theory we develop. Finally, we verify
that in this mechanism it is indeed optimal to report the arrival time truthfully.

5.1

Truthful Reporting of Arrivals

In the first step we find a necessary condition such that the buyer wants to report
his arrival immediately. Observe that if it were optimal for the buyer to reveal his
presence to the mechanism immediately, then the value from revealing his presence
18

at any stopping time α̂ must be smaller than revealing his presence at time zero. As
the buyer can condition the time at which he reports his arrival to the mechanism
on his past valuations, the following constraint must hold for all stopping times α̂,
which may depend on the buyer’s valuation path (θt )t :10


V (θ0 ) ≥ sup E e−(r+γ) α̂ V (θα̂ ) | θ0 .

(IC-A)

α̂

We first show that the buyer’s value function V in any incentive-compatible mechanism must be continuously differentiable and convex.
Proposition 3 (Differentiability and Convexity of Value Function).
The value function in any incentive-compatible mechanism is continuously differentiable and convex.
Proof. It follows from the envelope theorem that the value function is continuous and
convex in any mechanism where truthfully reporting the initial valuation is incentivecompatible. Furthermore, the envelope theorem implies that V is absolutely continuous, thus any non-differentiability must take the form of a convex kink. As it is never
optimal to stop in a convex kink it follows that V is differentiable.
If the buyer’s arrival time were observable, then the indirect utility need not be
continuously differentiable as illustrated in Section 4. By contrast, with unobservable
arrival, if the buyer finds it optimal to report his arrival immediately, then (IC-A)
implies that there cannot be kinks in the value function. This is because a kink in the
value function would imply a first-order gain for the buyer through the information
he would get by waiting to report his arrival time. As the cost of waiting due to
discounting is second-order, this implies that a mechanism with a kinked indirect
utility cannot be incentive-compatible. Thus, Proposition 3 strengthens Proposition
1 by guaranteeing differentiability of the value function.
In the next step, we will relax the problem by restricting the buyer to a small
class of deviations in reporting his arrival. The class of deviations we are going to
10

This is a version of the revelation principle as the seller can replicate every outcome where
the buyer does not report his arrival immediately in a contract where the buyer reveals his arrival
immediately, but never gets the object before he would have revealed his arrival in the original
contract.
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consider is to have the buyer report his arrival the first time his valuation crosses a
time-independent cutoff x > θ0 :
τx = inf{t ≥ 0 : θt ≥ x} .
Note that the optimal deviation of the buyer will not (necessarily) be of this form for
every direct mechanism. By restricting to deviations of this form we hope that in the
optimal mechanism the optimal deviation will be of this form and the restriction will
be non-binding. With the geometric Brownian motion, we can explicitly compute
the expected discounted time for a buyer with initial value θ0 to hit any arbitrary
valuation threshold x.
Lemma 2 (Expected Discounted Time).
The expected discounted time τx = inf{t : θt ≥ x} until a buyer’s valuation exceeds a
threshold x conditional on the initial valuation θ0 is given by


E e−(r+γ) τx | θ0 = min

(

θ0
x

)

β

,1

.

(16)

Thus, if the initial value θ0 exceeds the threshold x, then the expected discounted
time is simply 1. In other words, there is no waiting at all. By contrast, if the initial
value θ0 is below the threshold x, then the expected discounted time is smaller when
the gap between the initial value θ0 and target threshold x is larger. The magnitude
of the discounting is again determined entirely by the constant β, which summarizes
the primitives of the dynamic environment, namely r, γ, and σ 2 , as defined earlier in
(14).

5.2

Information Rents Associated with Unobservable Arrival

We established in Lemma 2 that the payoff from deviating to τx when reporting the
arrival time, while continuing to report values truthfully, is given by:


E e−(r+γ) τx V (vτx ) | θ0 = V (x)
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θ0
x

β
.

The term


θ0
x

β

captures the discount factor caused by the time the buyer has to wait to reach a
value of x before participating in the mechanism. When the buyer then participates
in the mechanism he receives the indirect utility V (x) of a buyer whose initial value
equals x. Now, in any mechanism where (IC-A) is satisfied the buyer does not want
to deviate to the strategy τx and we must have

V (θ0 ) ≥ V (x)

θ0
x

β

⇔ V (x)x−β ≤ V (θ0 )θ0−β .

(17)

As (17) holds for all θ0 and x > θ0 , we have that the buyer does not want to deviate to
any reporting strategy (τx )x>θ0 if and only if V (x)x−β is decreasing. Taking derivatives
yields that this is the case whenever11
V 0 (x) ≤ β

V (x)
.
x

(18)

By the earlier revenue equivalence result (see Proposition 1), the derivative of the
value function V (θ) is equal to the aggregate quantity q(θ), thus
q(θ0 ) = V 0 (θ0 ).
We therefore obtain a necessary condition for the aggregate quantity q(θ0 ) to ensure
that the buyer is reporting his arrival truthfully.
Proposition 4 (Upper Bound on Discounted Quantities).
The aggregate quantity is bounded from above by
q(θ0 ) ≤ β

V (θ0 )
θ0

(19)

in any mechanism where it is optimal to report arrival truthfully, i.e. that satisfies
(IC-A).
11

0 ≥ V 0 (x)x−β − βx−β−1 V (x) ⇒ V 0 (x) ≤ β V x(x) .
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Intuitively, (19) bounds the discounted quantity a buyer of initial type θ0 can
receive. Note that (19) is always satisfied if the value function of all initial values θ0
of the buyer from participating in the mechanism is sufficiently high. Intuitively, due
to discounting the buyer does not want to delay reporting his arrival when the value
from participating is high. As we can always increase the value to all types of the
buyer by possibly offering a subsidy to the lowest type, we can reformulate (19) as a
lower bound on the value V (0) of the lowest type θ0 = 0.
Proposition 5 (Lower Bound on Information Rent).
In any mechanism which satisfies (IC-A) we have that

V (0) ≥ sup
θ∈Θ

θq(θ)
−
β

ˆ

θ


q(z)dz

.

0

Proof. By Proposition 1 and 4 we have that IC-A implies that for all θ

θ q(θ)
⇔
−
β

ˆ

θ q(θ)
≤ V (θ) = V (0) +
β

ˆ

θ

q(z)dz
0

θ

q(z)dz ≤ V (0) .
0

Taking the supremum over θ yields the results.
The above result establishes a lower bound on the cost of providing the buyer with
incentives to report his arrival time truthfully. This lower bound depends only on
the allocation q. Intuitively, the seller may need to pay subsidies independent of the
buyer’s type to provide incentives for the buyer to report his arrival time truthfully
if the quantity q is too convex and the option value of waiting is thus too high.12
The subsidy would correspond to a payment made to the buyer upon arrival and
independent of his reported value θ0 . Such a scheme makes delaying the arrival costly
to the buyer due to discounting, and it is potentially very costly as it requires the
seller to pay the buyer just for “showing up.” We will show that in the optimal
12

An immediate corollary from this formula is that it is infinitely costly to implement a policy
which leads to a value function V that admits a convex kink and thus has an infinite derivative
V 0 = q at some point, as argued in Proposition 3.
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mechanism this issue will not be relevant, as the optimal mechanism does not reward
the buyer merely for arriving.13
As a consequence of Proposition 5 we get an upper bound on the revenue in any
incentive-compatible mechanism.
Corollary 1 (Revenue Bound).
An upper bound on the revenue in any incentive-compatible mechanism is given by
ˆ

θ


q(z)J(z)dF (z) − max

0

θ∈[0,θ]

θq(θ)
−
β

ˆ

θ


q(z)dz

.

(20)

0

The upper bound on revenue in (20) is obtained by considering only a small class of
deviations. In particular, the buyer is only allowed to misreport his arrival via simple
threshold strategies where he enters the mechanism once his valuation is sufficiently
high. Economically,


ˆ θ
θq(θ)
V (0) = max
−
q(z)dz
β
θ∈[0,θ]
0
is a lower bound on the information rent the buyer must receive to ensure that he
reports his arrival truthfully in a mechanism which implements the allocation q. As
discussed before, this information rent is paid to the buyer in the form of a transfer
that is independent of his consumption, and thus is even received by those types who
never consume the object. We note that due to the maximum this information rent
cannot be rewritten as an expectation and thus is fundamentally different from the
classical information rent term. As a consequence, pointwise maximization cannot be
used to find the optimal contract even in the relaxed problem. We next develop the
mathematical tools to deal with this type of non-standard maximization problem.

5.3

Optimal Control and Comparison Principle

We now characterize the optimal mechanism. To do so we proceed by first finding the
allocation q that maximizes the upper bound on revenue (20). Second, we construct an
13

Such subsidy schemes were discussed in Gershkov et al. (2015, 2018) in a context where the
buyer’s value does not evolve over time. In Gershkov et al. (2015) such subsidies are sometimes
necessary in order to to incentivize the buyer to report his arrival time truthfully.
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incentive-compatible mechanism that implements this allocation. As (20) is an upper
bound on revenue in any incentive-compatible mechanism, we then find a revenuemaximizing mechanism.
A mathematical challenge is that due to the information rent from arrival, the
relaxed problem (20) is non-local and non-linear in the quantity q. A change of
the quantity for one type can affect the surplus extracted from all higher and lower
types. Consider the relaxed problem of finding the revenue-maximizing mechanism
such that the buyer never wants to misreport his arrival using a cut-off stopping time.
By Proposition 4, the indirect utility V of the buyer in this mechanism solves the
optimization problem:
ˆ

θ

V 0 (z)J(z) f (z) dz − V (0),

max
V

(21)

θ

subject to

V (θ) ∈ 0,
0

1
r+γ


for all θ,

V is convex,
V 0 (θ) ≤ β

V (θ)
for all θ∈ (0, 1) .
θ

(22)
(23)
(24)

We will further relax the problem by initially ignoring the convexity constraint
(23) and later verifying that the relaxed solution indeed satisfies the convexity condition. By the revenue equivalence result, Proposition 1, we can restate the allocation
problem in terms of the indirect utility of the buyer. The novel and important restriction is given by the inequality (24) that states that the information rent of the buyer
cannot grow too fast. The inequality thus presents an upper bound on the allocated
quantity q(θ) = V 0 (θ).14
We could approach the above problem as an optimal control problem where V (θ)
is the state variable and V 0 (θ) is the control variable. The presence of the derivative
constraint (24) which combines, in an inequality, the state and the control variable
14

At this point we skip a complete formulation of the original problem as we later directly verify
that the solution to the relaxed problem is implementable. We could state the original problem as a
2 2
calculus of variations problem where the condition (24) would have to be replaced by V 00 (θ) σ 2θ ≤
(r + γ) V (θ) under a suitable generalized notion of the second derivative.
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renders this problem intractable. In particular, to the best of our knowledge the current problem is not directly covered by any standard result in optimization theory.15
In particular, while a non-standard version of the Pontryagin maximum principle
with state-dependent control constraints could in principle be used to deal with the
derivative constraint (24),16 this approach would lead to a description of the optimal
policy in terms of a multi-dimensional ordinary differential equation (ODE). And
significantly, we cannot infer the optimal policy from the resulting multi-dimensional
ODE.
To avoid these issues, we adopt a proof technique that has proved useful in stochastic optimal control, as established by Peng (1992)–see also Karoui et al. (1997) for a
wide range of applications of this technique. A comparison principle asserts a specific
property of a differential inequality if an auxiliary inequality has a certain property.
An important comparison result is Gronwall’s inequality that allows us to bound a
function that is known to satisfy a certain differential inequality by the solution of
the corresponding differential equation. Following standard arguments in the literature on comparison principles, we use Gronwall’s inequality to establish the following
lemma.
Lemma 3 (Comparison Principle).
Let g, h : [0, θ] → R be absolutely continuous and satisfy g 0 (θ) ≤ Φ(g(θ), θ) and
h0 (θ) ≥ Φ(h(θ), θ) where Φ : R × [0, θ] → R is uniformly Lipschitz continuous in the
first variable. If g(0) ≤ h(0) we have that g(θ) ≤ h(θ) for all θ ∈ [0, θ].
We can then use the comparison principle to show that in optimization problems
with a differential inequality constraint one can increase the objective by making the
constraint binding. This yields the following characterization of the optimal solution.
Theorem 1 (State-Dependent Control Constraints).
Let Φ : R × [0, θ] → R+ be increasing and uniformly Lipschitz continuous in the
first variable as well as continuous in the second on every interval [a, θ] for a > 0.17
15

This constraint is fundamentally different from the Border constraint appearing in multi-buyer
mechanism design problems, which is a (weak) majorization constraint.
16
See for example Evans (1983) for a detailed introduction into the Pontryagin maximum principle.
17
This means that for every a > 0, there exists a constant La < ∞ such that |Φ(v, θ) − Φ(w, θ)| ≤
La · |v − w| for all θ ∈ [a, θ].
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Let J : [0, θ] → R be continuous, satisfy J (0) = −1 and z 7→ min{J (z), 0} be
non-decreasing. Consider the maximization problem:
ˆ

J (θ)w0 (θ)dθ − w(0) .

max
w

θ

(25)

0

over all differentiable functions w : [0, θ] → R that satisfy w0 (θ) ≤ Φ(w(θ), θ). There
exists an optimal policy w to this problem such that for all θ ∈ (0, θ]
w0 (θ) = Φ(w(θ), θ) .

(26)

Intuitively, keeping the quantity w0 (θ) given to the type θ with J (θ) = 0 fixed and
making the constraint bind will increase the quantity w0 given to higher types and
decrease the quantity given to lower types, which is beneficial. To apply Theorem 1
to the optimization problem given by (21), (22), and (24) we define
J (θ) , f (θ)J(θ),
and



1
v
Φ(v, θ) , min β ,
θ r+γ


.

An immediate observation is that J (0) = −1 . Applying Proposition 1 to the optimization problem (21)-(24) by ex-post verifying that the solution is non-negative
and convex, and hence feasible, yields the following characterization of the relaxed
optimal mechanism.
Theorem 2 (Optimal Control).
There exists a θ? ∈ [0, θ] such that a solution to the control problem (21)-(24) is given
by
 
 θ β θ? /β ,
for θ ≤ θ? ,
θ?
r+γ
V (θ) =
.
(27)
 θ? /β + θ−θ? , for θ? ≤ θ,
r+γ
r+γ
We arrived at the optimization problem (21)-(24) by relaxing the original mechanism design problem in two ways. First, we allowed the buyer to misreport his arrival
only using cut-off stopping times. Second, we ignored the monotonicity constraint
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associated with truthful reporting of the initial value. Next, we establish that the
solution of Theorem 2 can be implemented by a simple indirect mechanism, namely
a posted price.

5.4

Posted Price as an Optimal Progressive Mechanism

Using the characterization of the purchase behavior of the buyer in Proposition 2
and standard stochastic calculus arguments, we can completely describe the seller’s
average revenue for a given sales contract.
Theorem 3 (Sales Contracts are Revenue Maximizing).
The revenue-maximizing mechanism can be implemented by a posted price p? which
maximizes the flow revenue:
p
r

ˆ

(

∞

min
0

β−1 θ
β p

β

)
,1

f (θ) dθ .

(28)

Proof. By Proposition 2, the buyer acquires the object once his valuation exceeds
β
θ? = β−1
p. By Lemma 1, the expected revenue which the seller generates from a
buyer with initial valuation θ0 is given by
r+γ
E
r

ˆ

∞
−(r+γ) t

e
τθ ?



 p 

1 
p dt | θ0 = E e−(r+γ) τθ? p | θ0 = E e−(r+γ) τθ? | θ0
r
r
( 
(
)
β )
β
p
θ0
p
β − 1 θ0
= min
, 1 = min
,1 .
?
r
θ
r
β p

Consequently, the expected discounted revenue from buyer with random initial valuation distributed according to F is given by
p
r

ˆ

(

∞

min
0

β−1 θ
β p

β

)
,1

f (θ) dθ .

Consider the sales contract where the object is sold at a flow price of p = β−1
θ? .
β
Proposition 2 yields that the buyer’s value in a sales contract, if he reports his arrival
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optimally, is given by

V (θ) =





1
r+γ
1
r+γ


θ β 1 ?
θ
?
θ
β


θ−

for θ ≤ θ?

β−1 ?
θ
β



for θ ≥ θ?

,

and thus satisfies (27), establishing that the sales contract is revenue-maximizing.
Equation (28) reduces the problem of finding an optimal sales contract to a singledimensional maximization problem over the price. It is worth noting that the revenue
up to a linear scaling depends on r, γ, σ only through β, which implies that the optimal
sales price is only a function of β and the distribution of initial valuations F .
The expression inside the integral of (28) represents the expected quantity to be
sold to a buyer with initial value θ. In contrast to a standard revenue function under
unit demand, the realized quantities are not merely 0 or 1. Rather, the seller offers a
positive quantity to all buyers, namely
(
min

β−1 θ
β p

)

β

,1 .

(29)

This expression reflects the expected discount until the object is consumed by those
buyers who have an initial value below the optimal purchase threshold
w(p) =

β
p,
β−1

derived in Proposition 2. The indirect utility given in (27) is then implemented by a
sales contract with a flow price of
p? =

β−1 ?
θ .
β

The complete expression (29) then follows from Lemma 2 as the expected discounted
probability of a sale to a buyer with initial value θ. Thus, an increase in the sales
price p uniformly lowers the probability of a sale for every value θ. The problem for
the seller with unobservable arrival is therefore how to respond to slower and more
selective sales. As the revenue with relaxed incentive constraints is an upper bound
28

on the revenue in the original problem, and this upper bound is achieved by some
sales contract, it follows that a sales contract is a revenue-maximizing mechanism.

6
6.1

Discussion
An Example: The Uniform Prior

We illustrate the results now for the case of the uniform prior on the unit interval
[0, 1]. We compute the value threshold θ? and the associated flow price p? in the
optimal progressive mechanism from the revenue formula (28):
θ? =

11+β
,
2 β

p? =

1 β2 − 1
.
2 β2

In the dynamic mechanism, the value threshold and the associated price are determined exclusively by the virtual value at t = 0, and thus under the uniform distribution, the corresponding threshold and flow price are given by
1
θ ◦ = p◦ = .
2
Thus, the price in the progressive mechanism is below the dynamic mechanism,
whereas the threshold of the progressive mechanism is above the dynamic mechanism:
p? < p◦ = θ◦ < θ? .
(30)
In Figure 2 we display the behavior of the thresholds and the prices as a function
of β ∈ (1, ∞). If the discount and/or the renewal rate decrease, the buyer becomes
more forward-looking and the gap between the value threshold θ? and the price p∗
increases. Intuitively, as the option value becomes more significant, the buyer chooses
to wait until his value has reached a higher threshold and thus he will wait longer to
enter into a relationship with the seller. Faced with a more forward-looking buyer,
the seller decreases the flow price as β decreases. Yet, the decrease in the flow price
only partially offsets the option value, and the buyer still waits longer to enter into
the relationship with the seller. In contrast, the threshold value and the price in
29

Price / Threshold

1.0
0.8
0.6
0.4
0.2
0.0

2

4

6

8

10

β

Figure 2: Progressive threshold (solid red), dynamic threshold and price (dotted
black), and progressive price (dashed blue). The initial value θ0 is uniformly distributed on [0, 1].
the dynamic mechanism, θ◦ and p◦ , respectively remain invariant with respect to the
patience β of the buyer.
An important aspect of the progressive mechanism is that the buyer enters the
relationship gradually rather than once and for all, as in the dynamic mechanism.
In Figure 3a we plot the probability that an initial type drawn from the uniform
distribution consumes the object as a function of the time since his arrival. In the
dynamic mechanism, this probability is constant over time. As all values θ0 above
θ◦ = 1/2 buy the object, and all those with initial values θ0 < θ◦ = 1/2 never buy the
object, the probability of consumption does not change over time, and is always equal
to 1/2. By contrast, in the progressive mechanism, the probability of participation
is progressing over time, and thus the probability of consumption is increasing over
time. The geometric Brownian motion displays sufficient variance, so that eventually
every buyer purchases the product.
We now zoom in on the purchase behavior of the initial types θ0 . Figure 3b illustrates the discounted expected consumption quantity q(θ0 ) as a function of the initial
valuation θ0 for various values of β. In the dynamic mechanism there is a sharp distinction in the consumption quantities between the initial values below and above the
threshold of θ◦ = 1/2. By contrast in the progressive mechanism, the consumption
quantity is continuous and monotone increasing in the initial value θ0 . As the buyer
becomes more patient, and hence as β decreases, the slope of the consumption quan30
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(a) Consumption probability over time: progressive (orange), dynamic (blue). The initial valuation is uniformly distributed on [0, 1], β = 1.5 and
σ = 1.

(b) Quantities assigned in dynamic and progressive mechanism: β = 1.5 in blue, β = 3 in yellow,
β = 6 in green, observable arrival in red. The
initial valuation is uniformly distributed on [0, 1].

tity flattens outs and the threshold θ? upon which consumption occurs is immediately
increasing.

6.2

Positive Production Cost

We assumed so far that the marginal cost of production for the seller is constant and
equal to zero. We now discuss the case of positive production cost, c > 0. The value
of the buyer from consumption is unchanged and can still be expressed completely in
terms of the aggregate quantity q defined in (6). It follows from the expression (9)
that the virtual value of the buyer at time t is given by Jt (θt ) = θt J(θ0 ).
If the cost of production is given by a fixed cost that the seller has to incur once
and only once, then our earlier analysis remains essentially unchanged. The only
modification arises in the determination of the optimal threshold θ? , which is now
influenced by the cost of production. The more challenging situation is the case of
the positive flow cost c > 0 that has to be incurred every time the good is consumed.
Here we can define the indirect production cost of the seller C : R → R as the minimal
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cost necessary for providing the agent with a given aggregate quantity q, i.e.
ˆ

∞
−(r+γ) t



e
xt c dt
C(q) = min E
x
0
ˆ ∞
 2
 
σ
−(r+γ) t
s.t.
q=E
e
xt exp − t + σ Wt dt .
2
0
Taking the Lagrangian yields that the optimal policy in the
problem
is to

 above
2
allocate the object to the agent if and only if θt /θ0 = exp − σ2 t + σ Wt exceeds
some threshold φ. This allocation rule is implementable as it is monotone in θt (see
Bergemann and Strack, 2015). The indirect cost thus simplifies to
ˆ

∞

 2


σ
e
P exp − t + σ Wt ≥ φ dt
C(q) = c
(31)
2
0
ˆ ∞
 
 2
σ
−(r+γ) t n


o
e
1 exp − σ2 t+σ W ≥φ exp − t + σ Wt dt .
s.t.
q=E
t
2
2
0
−(r+γ) t



The optimal contract thus has the form that it offers a menu of time-independent
flow prices for consuming the good coupled with upfront payments. A higher upfront
payment leads to a lower price of consuming the good later. To derive the exact
optimal menu the seller now needs to solve the analogue of problem (21)-(24) with
production cost C:
ˆ

θ

[V 0 (z)J(z) − C(V 0 (z))] f (z) dz − V (0),

max
V

θ

subject to

V (θ) ∈ 0,
0

1
r+γ


for all θ,

V is convex,
V 0 (θ) ≤ β

V (θ)
for all θ∈ (0, 1) .
θ

As this problem is non-linear in V 0 we can no longer appeal to a version of the
comparison result that we developed in Proposition 1. As discussed earlier in Section
5.3, we could pursue a non-standard version of the Pontryagin maximum principle
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with state-dependent control constraints to address this problem, but this would
require a distinct approach. Here, we restrict ourselves to a numerical solution of
the problem and display a typical solution in Figure 3. The progressive solution
has the same qualitative form as the corresponding optimal dynamic mechanism (see
Proposition 9 in Bergemann and Strack (2015)). In particular, high initial types
face a lower threshold for receiving the good at later times (see the bottom left
illustration of Figure 3). In contrast to the case without production cost, no agent
now consumes the object forever and the seller never provides the object when the
value falls below the marginal cost of production. Low types are again indifferent
between entering the contract immediately and delaying. In equilibrium, they enter
the contract immediately upon arrival and consume in the future above a threshold φ
which exceeds their initial value. Intuitively, by having the buyers enter the contract
immediately, the seller can provide them with the same expected utility at a lower
cost, as she only provides them with the object when their value is sufficiently high.

7

Concluding Remarks

We considered a dynamic mechanism problem where each buyer is described by two
dimensions of private information: his willingness to pay (which may change over
time) and his arrival time. We considered a stationary environment—in which the
buyers arrive and depart at random—and a stationary contract. In this arguably more
realistic setting for revenue management, the seller has to guarantee both interim
incentives as well as interim participation constraints. As the buyer has the valuable
option of delaying his participation, the mechanism has to offer incentives to enter
into the relationship.
The central challenge in our environment is that the first-order approach and other
standard methods fail as global incentive constraints bind in the optimal contract.
We were able to solve this multi-dimensional incentive problem by rephrasing the
participation decision of the buyer as a stopping problem and then solving a new
optimal control problem. More precisely, we decomposed the progressive mechanism
problem into an intertemporal participation (entry) problem and an intertemporal
incentive problem. Given the separability between these two problems, our approach
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Figure 3: The indirect cost as defined in (31) (upper left). The optimal policy q(θ) =
V 0 (θ) (upper right). The threshold above which the agent consumes (bottom left) and
the upfront transfer (bottom right). The red line corresponds to the optimal contract
with observable arrival and the blue line to the optimal contract under our progressive
participation constraint. F is uniform on [0, 1], σ = 0.3,r + γ = 0.2, c = 0.4.
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can be possibly extended to allocation problems beyond the unit demand problem
considered here. There are (at least) two natural directions to extend the analysis.
First, the stochastic evolution of the value was governed by the geometric Brownian motion, and clearly other stochastic processes could be considered. What changes
for more general stochastic processes is the expected revenue as a function of the value
of the buyer given in (20) and (21). The particularly simple multiplicative structure
of the virtual value is a consequence of the geometric Brownian motion. For other
processes, such as the arithmetic Brownian motion, or the mean-reverting OrnsteinUhlenbeck process, the corresponding virtual value is obtained in Bergemann and
Strack (2015). Using these virtual values and adjusting the value for deviating to
a threshold strategy, one obtains a relaxed program that is analogous to (21)-(24).
Notably, this provides a reduction of our original dynamic problem into a completely
static problem without any incentive constraints.
For general processes or models the resulting problem will not admit the same
simple multiplicatively separable structure. As a consequence, we could not use our
Proposition 1 to solve for the optimal mechanism, but would have to rely on other
methods such as the Pontryagin Principle. Yet, whenever the solution to this relaxed
general program is implementable, i.e. monotone, and the progressive participation
constraint binds below a threshold, it will constitute an optimal mechanism. As we
illustrated in the convex cost case in Section 6.2, this can be checked numerically.
By contrast, if the virtual value were to react too strongly to the type, then
the progressive participation constraint (18) may be binding at several disconnected
intervals. This would imply that there is not a single and always lower interval at
which the agent would wait, but rather a collection of disconnected intervals. In each
one of these intervals, the agent would wait until his valuation leaves the interval,
either below or above. In consequence, the optimal strategy for the agent could not
be expressed in terms of a simple threshold strategy anymore, as it is in the current
setting.
Second, we derived the incentive constraint (IC-A) for stationary mechanisms
when the buyer has private information about his arrival time and his current value.
We motivated the restriction to a stationary mechanism as a standing offer by the
seller in a market with renewal among consumers. In other words, time 0 is not
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economically meaningful as new buyers are constantly arriving, and thus it is always
time 0 for someone. We did not analyze whether in the steady state of the environment
a stationary mechanism is optimal in a larger class of feasible mechanism, which can
be offered in a time- and state-dependent fashion.
Suppose we would consider an optimal non-stationary mechanism. In particular,
the mechanism could then depend on the calendar time t. Let V (t, θ) be the value
of a buyer who arrives at time t with a valuation of θ. Now, a generalized version
of the progressive participation constraint (IC-A) would be equivalent to a partial
differential equation:
Vt (t, θ) + Vθθ (t, θ)

σ 2 θ2
≤ (r + γ)V (t, θ) .
2

(32)

Thus, while the nature and description of the optimal mechanism has not changed
conceptually, the optimal control problem is now subject to a constraint in the form
of a partial differential equation. In general, it is not known how to obtain a solution
of an equation of this form. On a fundamental level, it is not known how to compute
the buyer’s optimal stopping time as a best response to an arbitrary non-stationary,
and thus time inhomogenous, policy by the seller, see Peskir and Shiryaev (2006).
However, in special cases of our model we know that a stationary policy is optimal.
For example, when there is only initial private information, and thus the variance σ of
the geometric Brownian motion is 0, Board (2008) shows that a stationary sale price
constitutes the optimal commitment policy. We suspect that as either the variance
or the discounting is small, the stationary solution will remain the uniquely optimal
solution. A complete analysis will require additional arguments to address a host of
additional challenges.
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A

Appendix

Proof of Lemma 1. As each buyer’s allocation is only a function of his own reports,
and the willingness-to-pay is independent across different buyers, the law of iterated
expectations implies that the revenue can be rewritten as
"
E

∞ ˆ
X

αi+1

#

"

e−r t pit dt = E

αi

i=0

∞
X

e−rαi E

ˆ

αi+1

#
e−r (t−αi ) pit dt .

αi

i=0

As buyers are ex-ante identical we can without loss assume that they are treated the
same in the optimal mechanism, which yields that the revenue equals
max E

(x,p)∈M

"∞ ˆ
X
i=0

αi+1

#
e−r t pit dt = max E

ˆ

(x,p)∈M

αi

αi+1

#
 "X
∞
e−r (t−αi ) pit dt E
e−rαi .

αi

i=0

Note that αi+1 − αi are independently and identically exponentially distributed with
rate γ. From this and the fact that α0 = 0 it follows that:
"
E

∞
X

#
−rαi

e

"
=E

∞
X

i=0

−rα0

e

i=0

=

∞
X

i−1
Y

#
−r(αj+1 −αj )

e

−rα0

=E e

j=0


i
E e−r(αj+1 −αj ) =

i=0



∞ Y
i−1
X



E e−r(αj+1 −αj )

i=0 j=0
∞ 
X
i=0

γ
r+γ

i
=

r+γ
.
r

This yields the result.
Proof of Proposition 1. The first part of the Proposition follows by applying the envelope theorem. By the hypothesis of the Proposition it is optimal for the buyer to
report his initial value θ0 truthfully. Therefore, we can compute the derivative of the
buyer’s indirect utility by treating the allocation (x, p) as independent of the buyer’s
report:

As (θt )t≥0

ˆ

∞



ˆ

∞



∂
e
{xt θt − pt } dt | θ0 = E
e
xt
θt dt | θ0
∂θ0
0
0
(33)
is a geometric Brownian motion, the evolution of θt can be explicitly rep-

∂
V (θ0 ) =
E
∂θ0
0

−(r+γ) t
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−(r+γ) t



resented as:

 2

σ
θt = θ0 exp − t + σWt .
2

(34)

We can then insert the derivative ∂θt /∂θ0 and obtain:
ˆ

∞





∂
V (θ0 ) = E
e
xt
θt dt | θ0
∂θ0
0

 2


ˆ ∞

σ
∂
−(r+γ) t
θ0 · exp − t + σWt
dt | θ0
=E
e
xt
∂θ0
2
0


ˆ ∞
 2
σ
−(r+γ) t
=E
e
xt exp − t + σWt dt | θ0
2
0
0

−(r+γ) t

= q(θ0 ),
where the last line follows from the definition of the aggregate quantity q(θ0 ) given
earlier in (5). Similarly, we can express the revenue of the seller in terms of the
dynamic virtual value as given earlier in (9):
Jt (θt ) , θt −

1 − F (θ0 ) dθt
,
f (θ0 ) dθ0

and we observe that using (34) we can express the derivative equivalently as
θt
dθt
= .
dθ0
θ0
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The expected revenue of the seller can therefore be expressed as:
ˆ

∞
−(r+γ) t

e

E
0



ˆ ∞
 
1 − F (θ0 ) dθt
−(r+γ) t
e
xt θt −
pt dt = E
dt − V (0)
f (θ0 ) dθ0
0
 
ˆ ∞

1 − F (θ0 )
−(r+γ) t
dt − V (0)
=E
e
xt θt 1 −
f (θ0 )θ0
ˆ0 ∞

 
θt
1 − F (θ0 )
=E
e−(r+γ) t xt
θ0 −
dt − V (0)
θ0
f (θ0 )
0



ˆ θ ˆ ∞
1 − F (θ0 )
θt
−(r+γ) t
θ0 −
dt | θ0 f (θ0 )dθ0 − V (0)
=
E
e
xt
θ0
f (θ0 )
0
0
 ˆ ∞

ˆ θ
1 − F (θ0 )
θt
−r t
=
θ0 −
e xt dt | θ0 f (θ0 )dθ0 − V (0) .
E
f (θ0 )
θ0
0
0

Plugging in the explicit representation of θt given by (34) yields that the expected
revenue satisfies

ˆ ∞
−(r+γ) t
e
pt dt
E
ˆ

0

ˆ

θ

=

∞
−(r+γ) t

e

J(θ0 )E
0

0

 2


σ
xt exp − t + σWt dt | θ0 f (θ0 )dθ0 − V (0) ,
2

where the expectation term inside the square bracket equals the aggregate quantity
q(θ0 ), i.e.:


 2
ˆ ∞
σ
−(r+γ) t
e
xt exp − t + σWt dt | θ0 .
q(θ0 ) = E
2
0
To establish monotonicity, consider the deviation where the agent of type θ0 reports to be of type θ̂0 at time 0 and at every later point in time t reports a value
of θ̂t = θt θθ̂00 . Note that under this deviation the agent’s value evolves as if the agent
would have been of initial type θ̂0 . Thus, this deviation generates a value of
ˆ

∞

e

E

−(r+γ) t



0

where T (θ̂0 ) = E




σ2
xt θ0 exp − t + σ Wt − pt dt | θ̂0 = θ0 q(θ̂0 ) − T (θ̂0 )
2

h´
∞
0



i
e−(r+γ) t pt dt | θ̂0 is the total expected transfer made by an

agent of initial type θ̂0 . It follows from the monotone selection theorem that q is non42

decreasing whenever truthful reporting of the initial type is incentive-compatible.
Proof of Lemma 2. For θ0 ≥ x, the buyer stops immediately and thus the statement
is true. For θ0 < x we have that


#
!β
"
2
 β
− σ2 τx +σWτx
 −(r+γ) τx

θ0 e
θτx
| θ0 = E e−(r+γ) τx
E e
| θ0 = E e−(r+γ) τx
| θ0 
θτx
x
" h
#
 β
i
σ2
θ
− (r+γ) − 2 β τx +βσWτx
0
=E e
| θ0
x
" h
#
 β
i
2 β2
σ2
σ
θ
− (r+γ) + 2 β(1−β) τx −
0
=E e
e 2 τx +β σ Wτx
| θ0 .
x
2

2 2

σ2 β 2

As (r + γ) + σ2 β − σ 2β = 0 and t 7→ e− 2 t+β σ Wt is a martingale whose value at time
τx is uniformly integrable, it follows from Doob’s optional sampling theorem that


E e−r τx | θ0 = E

"

θ0
x

β

#
| θ0 .

Proof of Lemma 3. Define ∆ ≡ g − h. Suppose that there exists a point θ0 such that
∆(θ0 ) > 0. As ∆(0) ≤ 0, and as ∆ is absolute continuous there exists a point θ00 such
that ∆(θ00 ) = 0, and as ∆0 ≥ 0, we have that ∆(θ) ≥ 0 for all θ ∈ [θ00 , θ0 ]. Combined
with the uniform Lipschitz continuity of Φ this implies that there exists a constant
L > 0 such that for all θ ∈ [θ00 , θ0 ]
∆0 (θ) = g 0 (θ) − h0 (θ) ≤ Φ(g(θ), θ) − Φ(h(θ), θ) ≤ |Φ(g(θ), θ) − Φ(h(θ), θ)|
≤ L |g(θ) − h(θ)| = L |∆(θ)| = L ∆(θ) .
0

By Gronwall’s inequality we thus have that ∆(θ0 ) ≤ ∆(θ00 )eL(θ −θ
tradicts the assumption that ∆(θ0 ) > 0 .

00 )

= 0, which con-

Lemma 4 (Generalized Comparison Principle).
Let g, h : [0, θ] → R be absolutely continuous and satisfy g 0 (θ) ≤ Φ(g(θ), θ) and
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h0 (θ) ≥ Φ(h(θ), θ) where Φ : R × [0, θ] → R is uniformly Lipschitz continuous in
the first variable. If g(θ̂) = h(θ̂) we have that g(θ) ≤ h(θ) for all θ ∈ [θ̂, θ], and
g(θ) ≥ h(θ) for all θ ∈ [0, θ̂] .


Proof. The first part of the result follows by considering the functions g̃(s) = g θ̂ + s , h(s) =


ȳ θ̂ + s and applying Lemma 3. The second part follows by considering the func



tions g̃(s) = −g θ̂ − s , h̃(s) = −h θ̂ − s for s ∈ [0, θ̂] and applying Lemma 3,
which implies that for all s ∈ [0, θ̂]
















g̃(s) ≤ h̃(s) ⇔ −g θ̂ − s ≤ −h θ̂ − s ⇔ g θ̂ − s ≥ h θ̂ − s .
Lemma 5.
Suppose that J : [0, θ] is a non-decreasing function with J (θ) ≤ 0, and g, h : [0, θ] →
R are absolutely continuous with g = h, then
ˆ

ˆ

θ

θ

0

J (θ)h0 (θ)dθ + J (0)h(0) .

J (θ)g (θ)dt + J (0)g(0) ≤
0

0

Proof. The result follows from integration by parts and the assumption that J (θ) ≤ 0:
ˆ

ˆ

θ
0

J (θ)g (θ)dt + J (0)g(0) =

[J (θ)g(θ)]θ=θ
θ=0

θ

−

0

g(θ)dJ (θ) + J (0)g(0)
0

ˆ

θ

g(θ)dJ (θ) + J (0)g(0)

= J (θ)g(θ) − J (0)g(0) −
0

ˆ
≤ J (θ)h(θ) − J (0)h(0) −
ˆ
=

[J (θ)h(θ)]θ=θ
θ=0
ˆ

−

θ

h(θ)dJ (θ) + J (0)h(0)
0

θ

h(θ)dJ (θ) + J (0)h(0)
0

θ

J (θ)h0 (θ)dθ + J (0)h(0).

=
0

Proof of Theorem 1. Let g be an arbitrary feasible policy in the optimization problem
(25). Define θ? = inf{θ : J (θ) ≥ 0}. As J is continuous J (θ? ) = 0. Let h : [0, θ] → R
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be the solution to
h0 (θ) = Φ(h(θ), θ),
h(θ? ) = g(θ? ) .
The proof proceeds in two steps: first we establish that h leads to a higher value of
the integral (25) above θ? ; and in the second step we establish the analogous result
below θ? .
Step 1: As g 0 (θ) ≤ Ψ(g(θ), θ) it follows from Lemma 4 that g(θ) ≤ h(θ) for
θ ∈ [θ? , θ] and g(θ) ≥ h(θ) for θ ∈ [a, θ? ] for every a > 0. As g and h are continuous
it follows that g(0) ≥ h(0) . The monotonicity of Φ in the first variable implies that
for θ ≥ θ?
g 0 (θ) ≤ Φ(g(θ), θ) ≤ Φ(h(θ), θ) = h0 (θ) .
As J (θ? ) = 0 and θ 7→ min{J (θ), 0} is non-decreasing, we have that J (θ) ≥ 0; for
θ ≥ θ? we have that
ˆ

ˆ

θ

θ

0

J (θ)h0 (θ)dθ .

J (θ)g (θ)dθ ≤
θ?

(35)

θ?

Step 2: Note that by Lemma 4 g(θ) ≥ h(θ) for θ ≤ θ? . Furthermore, by definition
of θ? we have that J (θ) = min{J (θ), 0} for θ ≤ θ? . As θ 7→ min{J (θ), 0} is nondecreasing, J (θ) is non-decreasing for θ ≤ θ? . Lemma 5 implies that
ˆ

ˆ

θ?

θ?

J (θ)h0 (θ)dθ + J (0)h(0) .

0

J (θ)g (θ)dθ + J (0)g(0) ≤
0

(36)

0

Combining the inequalities (35) and (36) with the assumption that J (0) = −1 yields
that
ˆ
ˆ
θ

θ

0

J (θ)h0 (θ)dθ − h(0) .

J (θ)g (θ)dt − g(0) ≤
0

0

As Φ is continuous in both variables, it follows that h is continuously differentiable
and thus feasible and an optimal policy.
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Proof of Theorem 2. Define J (θ) = J(θ)f (θ) and recall that θ◦ = min {θ : J (θ) = 0} .
We first note that J (θ) is negative for θ < θ◦ and J (0) = −1. Consider the problem
of solving
ˆ
V

θ

V 0 (z)J (z) dz − V (0) .

max
0
0



subject to V (θ) ≤ Ψ(V (θ), θ) for all θ∈ θk , θ ,
o
n
1
v
where Ψ(v, θ) = min β θ , r+γ . By Proposition 3, there exists an optimal policy
that solves
V 0 (θ) = Ψ(v, θ)
(37)
We have that all solutions to the ODE (37) are of the form

V (θ) =

where

1
r+γ

= V 0 (θ? ) =

β
V
θ0





θ β
0
θ

V (θ? )

V (θ? ) +

θ−θ?
r+γ

for θ ≤ θ?
for θ ≤ θ?

(θ? ) . Thus, plugging in V (θ? ) yields that

V (θ) =





θ β θ? /β
θ?
r+γ
? /β
?
θ

+ θ−θ
r+γ
r+γ

for θ ≤ θ?
for θ ≤ θ?

.

We note that V = 0 and V 0 is increasing. It is thus feasible in the control problem
(21)-(24), and we have hence found an optimal policy.
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